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This paper investigates the policy and welfare implications of forming an economic 
region in the context of a Cournot duopoly model. Some theoretical results are obtained. 
First, the economic region lowers the external tariff (against non-partner countries) less 
than its pre-integration level when a sufficiently large subsidy on the imports from the 
partner is carried out. Second, economic integration reduces the non-partner country’s 
welfare. Third, although the region still gains from integration even under some partial 
trade liberalisation regimes, complete trade liberalisation within the region leads to higher 
regional welfare. Finally, trade liberalisation within the region improves the welfare of 
the world as a whole. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The resurgence of regional economic integration since the late 1980s has 
caught the attention of many economists. Consequently, there have been many 
important contributions, both theoretical and empirical, that have been concerned 
with the impacts and perspectives of economic integration. For instance, Richardson 
(1993) shows that a small home country will lower the tariff against the nonpartner if 
a free trade agreement (FTA) causes the FTA partners’ price to fall below the 
nonpartner’s tariff-inclusive price. Panagariya and Findlay (1994) demonstrate that a 
FTA may lead to higher tariffs between blocs since the workers that previously 
lobbied for protection against the FTA partner countries will be used to lobby for 
protection against the rest of the world. Bond and Syropoulos (1996) study the 
effects of bloc size on market power and world welfare, and find that sufficiently 
large increases in the relative size of a bloc enhance its relative market power and 
cause the welfare of its members to rise above the free trade level. Levy (1997) uses 
a median-voter model, showing that while bilateral free-trade agreements may 
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undermine political support for further multilateral trade liberalisation, they can 
never enhance political support for multilateral free trade. Utilising a version of the 
model adopted by Bond and Syropoulos (1996); Bond, et al. (2001) derive 
conditions under which the deepening of integration within a customs union, 
accompanied by a Kemp-Wan reduction in its external tariff, will be incentive- 
compatible both for the union and outside countries. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this, the issue concerned with the implications of 
Article XXIV of the GATT has not been satisfactorily analysed, though it has been 
extensively studied [e.g., McMillan (1993)]. This article requires that (1) trade 
restrictions against nonpartner countries should not be increased after integration, 
and (2) that trade barriers within the region in which economic integration takes 
place should eventually be completely eliminated. It is quite clear that the intention 
behind the first part is to prevent the nonpartner countries from being harmed by the 
formation of economic blocs. As for the second requirement, it would be of interest 
to know whether internal trade liberalisation will improve the welfare for an 
economic region. In other words, we would like to know whether there is any 
economic rationale for the requirement of complete trade liberalisation within a 
regional economic bloc. These are the questions we are interested in and will attempt 
to answer in this paper.  
We employ the familiar Cournot-Nash framework and compare two sub-game 
perfect equilibria, one for the pre-integration case and the other for the 
post-integration one. The pre-integration case consists of two stages. In the second 
stage, the exporting firms choose their optimal output levels, taking the tariffs 
imposed by the importing country as given. In the first stage, the government of the 
importing country decides the level of the tariffs, knowing how the second-stage 
Cournot equilibrium between the firms is affected by the first-stage policy choices. 
The post-integration case consists of three stages. The third stage is exactly the same 
as the second stage of the pre-integration case except that the tariffs are set by the 
economic region under consideration. In the second stage, the economic region 
determines the optimal external tariff (against the nonpartner countries), taking into 
account its impact on the firms’ behaviour and the given internal tariff. The internal 
tariff (against the partner countries) is decided in the first stage, again taking into 
account its impact on the latter two stages.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic 
model to investigate the pre-integration case. Section 3 first examines the 
relationship between the internal and external tariffs after the economic region is 
formed, and then goes on to study the welfare impact of the economic integration on 
the nonpartner countries. Section 4 analyses the incentive for the economic 
integration to take place and also the welfare impact of the economic integration on 
the whole world.  Section 5 summarises our main results.  
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2.  THE PRE-INTEGRATION MODEL 
Assume that two exporting firms 1 and 2, which are located in countries A and 
B, respectively, produce differentiated goods, q1 and q2, and export them to country 
C.1  Following the familiar framework, let U(q1, q2, M) be country C’s utility: 
U (q1, q2, M) = V (q1, q2, M) … … … … … (1) 
where 21
2
2
2
1221121 2)(),( qqqqqqqqV δ−+β−α+α= denotes the utility from 
consuming the differentiated goods, and M is the utility from consuming the 
numeraire good whose price is set to one. The demand functions for the two goods 
can then be derived as follows: 
Pi = αi – βqi – δqj, i ≠ j, i, j= 1,2, … … … … (2) 
where Pi is the price of good qi, and αi, β, and δ are assumed to be positive, with 
β≥δ.2  
Let ci and fi denote firm i’s marginal cost and fixed cost, respectively, and ti be 
the import tariff imposed by country C on firm i. Firm i’s profit function can then be 
written as 
2,1,)( =−−−=π ifqtcP iiiiii  … … … … (3) 
Country C’s welfare function w  consists of the consumer’s surplus CS, and 
tariff revenue t1q1 + t2q2: 
2211 qtqtCSw ++=   … … … … … (4) 
where 221121 ),( qPqPqqVCS −−= . 
The structure of the game is as follows. In the first stage, country C chooses 
optimal tariffs. Once the tariffs are determined, two exporting firms will compete 
with each other in a Cournot-Nash fashion. The equilibrium can be solved by 
applying the backward induction method. 
Given the tariffs, firm i will choose the optimal level of output to satisfy the 
following first-order condition: 
 
1A typical duopoly example is the European aircraft maker Airbus and its U.S. rival Boeing Co. in 
the production of large airliners. In addition, the duopoly model is used widely in the strategic trade 
literature, such as in Brander and Spencer (1984, 1985); Eaton and Grossman (1986); Dixit (1988); Collie 
(1991, 1994); Levy and Nolan (1992) and Bhattacharjea (1995) etc. 
2Note that αi indicates the size of market while a positive δ can be used to measure the degree of 
substitution between the two differentiated goods. A higher δ implies a higher degree of substitution. 
When δ = β, q1 and q2 are homogeneous goods. The assumption β > δ also ensures that the second-order 
conditions and stability conditions discussed in the following sections are satisfied.  
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Using (2), the equations in (5) can be solved simultaneously to derive the Nash 
equilibrium output ∗iq  and price
∗
iP : 
2,1,,],)()(2[1 =≠δ−−α−β−−α=∗ jijitctc
Η
q jjjiiii ;  … (6a) 
,2,1,,)],())(2[(1 22 =≠−−αβδ+−−αδ−β−α=∗ jijitctc
Η
P jjjiiiii  (6b) 
where * denotes the equilibrium value under the pre-integration case, and H ≡ 4β2 – 
δ2 > 0. From (6a) and (6b), the following comparative static results can be obtained: 
2,1,,,0,02 =≠>δ=∂
∂<β−=∂
∂ ∗∗ jiji
Ηt
q
Ηt
q
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i ;   … … (7a) 
2,1,,,0,120
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i
i . … (7b) 
Thus, a decrease in tariff ti raises firm i’s exports while lowering those of firm j, and 
the price of good i decreases by a smaller extent than the change in tariff ti.  
By taking the exporting firms’ reactions to import tariffs into consideration, 
country C will choose a set of tariffs, )2,1( =∗ iti , to maximise its welfare. By 
substituting (6a) and (6b) into Equation (4), and totally differentiating w with respect 
to ti and setting it to zero, we obtain:  
2,1,
9 22
=δ−β
β=∗ iXt ii   … … … … … (8) 
where Xi ≡ 3β(αi ci) – δ(αj – cj) > 0, i ≠ j.3  Equation (8) indicates that the optimal 
tariffs on imports are positive when economic integration does not occur [see also 
Brander and Spencer (1984)]. We will compare the pre-integration tariffs with the 
post-integration ones that will be derived in the following section and explore the 
policy and welfare implications of economic integration.  
 
3A positive qi (i = 1,2) 
will ensure a positive Xi.  For qi > 0, ∀ i, the following conditions must be 
satisfied: (1) αi – ci – ti > 0, i = 1, 2; (2) α2 – t2 – [2β(α1 – t1)/δ] + (2βc1/δ) < c2 < α2 – t2 – [δ(α1 – t1 )/2β] + 
(δc1 / 2β).  
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3.  TARIFF POLICIES UNDER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
In this section, we assume that countries C and A decide to integrate economically. 
Apparently, without a transfer scheme, country C may not have an incentive to lower or 
even eliminate a tariff on the imports from country A. However, if a transfer scheme 
exists so that a loser from integration can be compensated by the gainer, then an 
economic region may emerge.4 In such a case, the region’s joint welfare will be the main 
concern in the formation of an economic region, and the internal tariff t1 and the external 
tariff t2 will be chosen to maximise the regional welfare. The incentive for the economic 
integration to exist will be presented in Section 4. 
Let W denote the region’s joint welfare which consists of country C’s welfare 
and partner firm A’s profit:  
W = CS + t1q1 + t2q2 + π1. … … … … … (9) 
Assume that the internal tariff t1 is determined prior to the external tariff t2.5 The 
structure of the game here therefore is a three-stage sub-game perfect equilibrium. That 
is, t1 will be chosen first and then followed by the determination of t2 in the second 
stage. Given t1 and t2, firms will compete in the output market in the last stage. Again, 
the model can be solved backwards. Since the solutions to the last stage are the same as 
those in Section 2, Equations (6)-(7) are still applicable in this section.  
Taking Equations (6) and (7) into account and given the internal tariff t1, the 
optimal external tariff ∗∗2t  which maximises the region’s joint welfare can be derived:6  
,
33 1
22
2 t
ct β
δ+−α=∗∗   … … … … … (10) 
where the superscript ** indicates the post-integration case. From Equation (10), the 
effect of a change in the internal tariff on the optimal external tariff is 
1
3
0
1
2 <β
δ=∂<
∗∗∂
t
t . … … … … … … (11) 
Thus, while lowering the internal tariff will lead to a lower external tariff, it is optimal for 
the economic region to lower the external tariff to a smaller extent than the internal tariff. 
In fact, the external tariff can be reduced at most by 1/3 of the reduction in the internal 
tariff when the two goods are homogeneous and demand is linear. 
 
4Kemp and Wan (1976) and Wooton (1988), for example, also discuss customs union issues from 
the perspective of regional welfare, assuming that some income redistribution mechanism exists.  
5It is worth noting that it does not matter whether the internal or external tariff is set first, or 
whether they are set simultaneously. The rationale is identical to the case where a monopolistic firm 
determines two variables sequentially or simultaneously. The proof can be found in Appendix A. 
6Here, the second-order condition is satisfied: ∂2 W/∂ 22t = –3β/H < 0.  
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Moreover, by using (8) and (9) we have 
)(
3 1122
∗∗∗∗ +β
δ=− tttt .  … … … … … (12) 
Recall that the pre-integration tariffs *1t and 
*
2t are positive. Therefore, the 
interrelationship between the internal trade policy and the external trade policy can 
be illustrated in Figure 1. This Figure indicates that the provision of a sufficiently 
large subsidy on the imports from the partner by the economic region is necessary for 
the external tariff to be lowered to a level less than its pre-integration level       
(i.e. ).*2
**
2 tt <   
Proposition 1. In the Cournot duopoly model, the economic region will lower 
the external tariff from its pre-integration level only if a sufficiently large subsidy on 
the imports from the partner is granted.  
 
Fig. 1.  
 
 
 
Knowing the effect of a change in the internal tariff on the external tariff, we 
now examine its impact on the post-integration profit of the nonpartner firm. By 
totally differentiating π2 with respect to t1, we obtain 
.0
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2
2
2
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t
t
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d
  
… … … … (13) 
The first and second terms in (13) are, respectively, the direct and indirect effects of 
a change in the internal tariff on the nonpartner firm’s profit. The direct effect is: 
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It is positive because a decrease in the internal tariff serves to switch country C’s 
demand for goods away from the nonpartner firm to the partner firm and thus lowers 
the nonpartner firm’s profit. The indirect effect (the second term in Equation (13)) is 
negative, as 0
1
2 >∂
∂ ∗∗
t
t  and  
0)1()(
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.  … … (14b) 
Using (6a) and (6b), it can be shown that the direct effect dominates the indirect 
effect. The sign of (13) is therefore positive. Thus we have 
Proposition 2. Economic integration with tariff barriers against partners 
being lowered or eliminated will reduce the nonpartner country’s welfare.  
We now turn to the first stage of the game, i.e. the determination of the 
internal tariff. Totally differentiating the region’s welfare with respect to t1 yields:  
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The three terms in Equation (15) respectively capture the effects of a change in 
the internal tariff on the partner firm’s profits, the consumer’s surplus, and the 
tariff revenue. Since the second-order condition is satisfied (i.e. d2W/ 21dt –(3β2 – 
δ2)/3βH < 0), the optimal internal tariff can be obtained by setting (15) equal to 
zero: 
011 <β−= ∗∗∗∗ qt . … … … … … … (16) 
The optimal internal tariff is negative. In other words, if the region were to maximise 
its joint welfare, a subsidy on the imports from the partner country would be the first 
best policy. In fact, such a subsidy policy will lead the partner country to produce at 
the point where 11 cP =∗∗  (see (5)) and thus reach the Pareto optimum. In a way 
similar to Dixit (1988), the subsidy serves to correct the distortion caused by the 
imperfect competition in the commodity market.7 
Using (6a), (8), (10), and (16), we have:  
 
7See also Syropoulos (1996). 
... ... ... ... … (15)
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0
3
2
12222 <δ−β
βδ−=− ∗∗∗∗ ttt . … … … … … (17) 
Thus, subsidising the partner firm while at the same time reducing the tariff imposed 
on the nonpartner firm will be the optimal strategy for the economic region to adopt. 
Thus we have: 
Proposition 3. In the Cournot duopoly model, the optimal policy package for 
the integrating region is to subsidise the imports from the partner country and to 
reduce tariff barriers on the imports from the nonpartner country.  
 
4.  THE INCENTIVE FOR ESTABLISHING THE  
ECONOMIC REGION 
The previous sections assume that countries A and C have indeed agreed to 
form an economic region. However, for the two countries to have such an incentive, 
the joint welfare of the economic region must increase after the integration. This 
section attempts to demarcate the range for the internal tariff over which the region’s 
welfare increases after its formation. An interesting by-product of this analysis is that 
we are able to show that the second-best policy is free trade among the member 
countries when the optimal subsidy policy is not practically feasible.  
Through a complicated calculation process, it can be shown that 
)(
6
3),(),( 1
2
1
22
2121 SRttttWttW −+Ηβ
δ−β−=− ∗∗∗∗ , … … … (18) 
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)9)(3(
)21(,
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1
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1
δ−βδ−β
δ+ββ≡δ−β
β≡ XSXR  Therefore, the region’s joint 
welfare increases after integration (i.e. 0),(),( 2121 >− ∗∗∗∗ ttWttW ) if and only if the 
internal tariff satisfies 
),()])
2
[(
2
,])
2
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2
( 11
212212
1
UL ttSRRSRRt =++−+−−∈ , … (19) 
where Ut1  and 
Lt1  are the upper and lower bounds. Under such circumstances, 
countries A and C will have incentives to form an economic region, provided that an 
appropriate compensation mechanism exists. Since 01 >Ut  and ,01 <Lt  the region’s 
joint welfare can be improved when the imports from the partner country are 
subsidised or even only partially liberalised. Moreover, it can be shown that 
21 Rt −=∗∗ , and 
=−∗∗ Ltt 11 ∗∗− 11 ttU 0])2[( 212 >+= SR . … … … (20) 
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That is, the post-integration optimal internal tariff (subsidy), ∗∗1t , will fall at the 
midpoint of the range ( Lt1 , 
Ut1 ). The results can be illustrated in Figure 2, where the 
welfare function ),( 21
∗∗ttW  is strictly concave with respect to t1 since 
),(
3
3),(
11
22
1
21 ∗∗∗∗ −β
δ−β−= tt
Ηtd
ttWd   … … … … (21a) 
and thus 
0),( 2
1
21
2
<
∗∗
dt
ttWd .  … … … … … … (21b) 
The regional welfare reaches the maximum at ∗∗= 11 tt , and decreases (increases) 
with t1 when ∗∗<> 11 )( tt . 
 
Fig. 2. 
 
 
Although the joint welfare reaches the maximum level when the optimal 
subsidy )t( ∗∗1 is granted, such a policy is not usually feasible [Bhattacharjea (1995)]. 
If for some reason a subsidy policy is not available, Figure 2 shows that complete 
elimination of the internal tariff will result in the highest level of welfare. Notice also 
that the partner countries could still jointly benefit from a partial liberalisation as 
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long as the post-integration internal tariff falls within the range ),0( 1
Ut . Thus we 
conclude: 
Proposition 4. Barring import subsidy, countries can benefit from economic 
integration even under a partial trade liberalisation regime, but complete 
abolishment of the tariff barriers among partner countries will result in the highest 
regional welfare.  
In addition, defining the world welfare as WT = W + π2 and using (2), (5)–(7) 
(13) and (15), we get  
),(
9
32336
112
4224
1
T
T
tt
Htd
Wd −β
δ+δβ−β−=  … … … (22) 
where −β−αδ−ββδ−−αδ−ββ−= 42222112221 36()])(8(2))(12(3[ cctT ).323 422 δ+δβ  
Since ,09)32336( 2422421
2 <βδ+δβ−β−= HtdWd T WT is also a strictly concave 
function of t1. Moreover, it can be shown that 011 <<∗∗ Ttt  and π2 > 0 so that we 
have the graph of Figure 2. Clearly, the world welfare increases when the tariff 
against partner countries is lowered. In other words, the welfare gains to the 
economic region are higher than the welfare losses to the nonpartner country. As a 
result, we arrive at the following proposition: 
Proposition 5. The world’s net welfare is likely to increase with the formation 
of economic integration. If import subsidies among the partner countries are not 
allowed, the welfare gains are the largest when free trade prevails within the 
economic region. 
An important lesson emerges from Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. When 
import subsidies are not available in an economic region, not only does free trade 
within the region lead to the highest regional welfare, but it also results in the highest 
net gains of the world welfare. Consequently, our results fully support the wisdom of 
the GATT’s Article XXIV, which requires trade barriers within any economic region 
be completely eliminated eventually. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The resurgence of economic integration since the late 1980s has led to a flurry 
of studies regarding their implications. From an economic viewpoint, there is no 
doubt that most attempts at economic integration have led to the adoption of policies 
aiming at reducing trade barriers against partner countries in the hope of achieving 
production efficiency, exploiting economies of scale, as well as accelerating 
economic growth. On the other hand, due to the concerns over the potentially 
negative impacts of economic integration on nonpartner countries, the GATT has 
endeavoured to regulate economic integration through its well-known Article XXIV. 
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In particular, this Article requires that (1) trade restrictions against nonpartner 
countries not be raised after integration, and (2) that trade barriers within the 
economic region eventually be completely eliminated. Apparently, the first 
requirement is to prevent the nonpartner countries from being harmed by the 
emergence of economic integration, while the second is based on the concept that 
free trade in part of the world is better than no free trade at all. Besides investigating 
the impact of economic integration on both the partner and nonpartner countries, it is 
also interesting and important to see the implications of the requirements of Article 
XXIV.  
In attempting to answer the questions mentioned above, we employ in this 
paper the Cournot duopoly model á la Brander and Spencer (1985) to study the 
welfare impacts of the formation of an economic bloc, with special attention 
being paid to the interdependence between the internal and external tariffs. Our 
major results are as follows: (1) the economic region will lower the external tariff 
(against nonpartner countries) from its pre-integration level when a sufficiently 
large subsidy on the imports from the partner is granted; (2) the formation of an 
economic bloc will reduce the nonpartner country’s welfare; (3) an economic 
region can gain from economic integration even trade is partially liberalised 
between partner countries though complete trade liberalisation within the region 
will lead to higher regional welfare; (4) trade liberalisation within the region will 
improve the welfare of the world as a whole. Above all, our results seem to 
support the above-mentioned second requirement of Article XXIV of the GATT. 
Admittedly, economic integration is a very complex phenomenon, mixing 
economic and geopolitical considerations. Therefore, it is impossible for our 
simple model to capture all the interesting aspects of this phenomenon. However, 
we still hope that our analysis has shed some light in furthering our knowledge 
about economic integration. 
 
APPENDIX A 
If the internal tariff t1 and the external tariff t2 are determined in the same 
stage, the following two equations will be solved simultaneously:  
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and using (5) – (7) we obtain 
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β−=  … … … … (A.3) 
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Alternatively, if t2 is determined in stage 1 and t1 in stage 2, we will solve   
∂W/ ∂t1=0 first and get  
),( 112
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1 ctt −α−β
δ=  … … … … … (A.5)  
Based on (A.5), in the setting **1t is a function of t2 and hence 
1 1 1
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2 2
2 1 2 2 1 2
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  … (A.6)  
Letting dW/dt2 = 0 and using (5)–(7) and (A.5) yields (A.4). Next, (A.3) will be 
obtained by substituting (A.4) into (A.5). Similarly, we can also obtain (A.3) by 
substituting (8) into (17) and can arrive at (A.4) by substituting (A.3) into (10).  
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